Applying mechanism design theory to implement the desired outcome of knowledge management in research organizations

Document Type : Original Research Paper

Authors

P.H.D،Institute for Management and Planning Studies،Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Knowledge is the main intellectual capital of any organization. Sharing and using the knowledge that lies in the minds and capabilities of people is one of the most important strategies for the all-round growth of organizations in today's era. This research is practical in terms of purpose and by applying mechanism design theory in knowledge management, it seeks to create and share tacit knowledge and latent expertise of each individual to adapt the organization to the interaction environment full of competition and flexibility in the face of environmental changes. The desired goal of the organization is to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in the dynamic environment to maintain the competitive advantage by using the effective management of knowledge resources. To facilitate the work processes of the organization, it is necessary to design, ensure and establish consistent mechanisms in order to create sufficient internal motivations to ensure full alignment between the individual optimizations of employees and the desired goal of the organization. In this research, proper to monitoring has been investigated in research organizations in order to ensure the correct performance of the tasks assigned to the project manager. From library method, study of rules and regulations in research organizations and subject literature, data has been collected and analyzed through mechanism design theory techniques. The results of this study show that people do not share their information, knowledge, and abilities without having proper incentives. The findings of this research show that the theory of mechanism design can guarantee the effectiveness of knowledge management in monitoring the correct implementation of research stages by creating sufficient internal motivations in the supervisor of the project to share tacit knowledge. The present research can be effective in increasing the awareness of managers of research organizations in order to properly monitor research projects and achieve the goals of the organization.

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